What Can the United States and Israel Accomplish in Iran

Commentary by Emily Harding

Published March 11, 2026

In his press conference on the morning of March 10, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made sure to define the goals of Operation Epic Fury. He said the goals were "straightforward" and "the same as the day . . . [he] gave . . . [his] first briefing." They are as follows: "One, destroy their missile stockpiles, their missile launchers and their defense industrial base; missiles and their ability to make them. Two: destroy their Navy. And three: permanently deny Iran nuclear weapons forever."

This intentional and direct assertion is notable because of reported daylight between the president, his staff, and Israel on the goals of this mission. In addition to the above goals, President Trump has said he seeks a change in the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, Israel has made clear that it holds the Iranian regime at fault for the October 7 attacks, and thus the destruction or breakup of the Islamic Republic is their goal.

How are these goals consistent or inconsistent? More importantly, which are achievable? A big goal with no accompanying plan is a dream, not a strategy. Experienced strategists will tell you that the key to success is knowing what you want, analyzing the costs of achieving it with clear eyes, and measuring resources against those costs.

The goals identified by the Pentagon, White House, and Israel span a spectrum. On one end, some are achievable at only the cost of an air campaign; at least half are not and occupy the other, political end of the spectrum. Even for some of the militarily achievable aims, the results will only be temporary without associated political change. Bombs can destroy physical objects like missile launchers, storage sites, and production facilities. Military force can destroy the Iranian navy, making the Strait of Hormuz far safer. Exceptionally large bombs can collapse buried nuclear facilities. But none of these weapons can destroy knowledge. Things can be rebuilt, if the regime chooses. Further, political changes require political decisions. The very nature of the regime would need to change to stop support to terrorist proxies or no longer threaten protestors.

This commentary will take apart the apparent goals of these campaigns and evaluate the costs required to achieve each. The list includes Secretary Hegseth's stated goals, along with those suggested by President Trump and implied by the Israeli government. The below list is ordered from largely achievable with an air-focused military campaign to those requiring the most political change.

1. Destroy Iran's navy.

   Iran's navy has been the regime's leverage over the region and the global economy. Iran uses its navy to harass ships and has consistently threatened to mine the strait and end oil shipments. Elements of the navy have been a tool for spreading weapons to the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian proxies. To end Iran's strangle grip on the Persian Gulf, its navy must rest at the bottom of it.

   The U.S. military has spent decades tracking Iranian ships, and its capabilities are well matched to sinking them. Eliminating the Iranian navy is measurable and achievable, and the United States has the tools to accomplish it with relatively minimal military cost. The longer the fight, however, the greater the cost to the global economy.

2. End Iran's missile program.

   Israel views Iran's missile program as an immediate and potentially existential threat. A nuclear-tipped missile could destroy the thin strip of land that is the state of Israel, and Iran has used its ballistic missile capabilities to hit targets across the Gulf.

   The United States and Israel have been mapping and tracking Iranian missile systems for years, and initial reports suggest strikes against those targets have been effective. Iran's launch rate has dropped precipitously in recent days, with estimates suggesting that upward of 80 percent of its missile launchers have been destroyed. At this rate, Iran could be left with only remnants of a program, including the plans for reconstitution.

3. End Iran's nuclear program.

   The United States and Israel emerged from the 12-day war claiming that Iran's nuclear program was "completely and totally obliterated." Yet, Operation Epic Fury has named permanent destruction of the nuclear program as one of its goals. Pickaxe Mountain is a potential target, following indications that Iran might have been working to establish it as an alternative site for enrichment and perhaps other nuclear-related activities. Iran likely still has control of enough highly enriched uranium to make a small, rudimentary nuclear weapon. Locating and removing it will be key to the actual destruction of the nuclear program.

These are the three goals Secretary Hegseth referenced in his press conference. All are at least largely militarily achievable, and all are underway. The next three, however, depend on political decisions, not the prowess of the U.S. and Israeli militaries.

1. Eliminate external support for Iran's terrorist proxy groups.

   This has been a longstanding goal of U.S. and Israeli policy but is not an explicitly stated objective of Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion. Iran has poured money and weaponry into a formidable regional proxy network of groups the United States classifies as terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, a range of groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. Over the last two years, Israel has worked to largely neutralize Hamas and Hezbollah. In the current conflict, the groups in Iraq and the Houthis have been largely quiet, perhaps out of a keen sense of self-preservation.

   Israel literally bombed Hezbollah's cash reserves, but that is not the same as ending financial support to these groups. Iran's infusions of cash have given these groups a large bang for their buck over the last decades, and ending this support will require a political decision inside the regime.

2. End massacres of protestors.

   On January 2, 2026, President Trump said that if Iran continued to massacre protestors, the United States would "come to their rescue" and is "locked and loaded and ready to go." He later backed off that comment, probably because he received a piece of excellent advice: Military action is a poor tool for this goal. The United States could bomb the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Basij, the internal police service responsible for putting down unrest, but these are vast and decentralized organizations that are true believers in the regime. Hitting a headquarters building will not end these organizations or their brutal torture of protestors. The Islamic Republic viewed these protests as a potentially regime-ending threat; no amount of U.S. military pressure would convince them to allow what they saw as a brewing revolution.

   A decisive political transformation would need to take place inside Tehran to accomplish this goal, including addressing the protestors' demands: real economic reforms and legitimate democratic elections that reflect the will of the people, not the stranglehold of the clerical establishment.

3. End the Islamic Republic and establish a replacement that no longer threatens Israel and the United States.

   This is the big one. Despite Hegseth's insistence that regime change is not one of the U.S. goals, President Trump has strongly suggested that he wants new leadership in Tehran. As recently as Monday, March 9, he said "I like the idea of internal [regime change] because it works well . . . I mean, I think we've proven that so far in Venezuela." The Israelis have repeatedly said that Iran was the root cause behind the brutal October 7 attacks and that they would not feel secure until Iran could no longer pose a threat.

   Here is where U.S. and Israeli interests are likely to diverge. President Trump seemingly would be satisfied with a tame version of the current leadership-one that submits to U.S. preferences but can also restore stability quickly. This approach is likely to bring down oil prices and might result in renewed negotiations, although the balancing act of satisfying both the United States and the remaining elements of an angry regime is nearly impossible. This tame leader may find themselves the recipient of a very quick coup.

   Israel would not be satisfied with such an outcome. It prefers a far more definitive fix-either the complete removal of the structures of the current regime or the Balkanization of Iran. Israel estimates that the chaos likely to ensure from either upheaval is worth it, because even if Iran is highly unstable, Israel would no longer be under threat. That is a greater concern to them than sky-high oil prices.

Oddly, here the argument comes full circle. President Trump's preferred outcome is a political move inside the regime. Bombing can create immense levels of pressure to make that decision but cannot create those facts on the ground. An exceptionally brave leader would need to step up to take the big risk and engage in the necessary political maneuvering to survive. Conversely, Israel could go a long way toward Balkanizing Iran with a military-centric covert action campaign. Already, reports are emerging of arms flowing to Kurdish groups inside Iran and perhaps to other ethnic minorities in the hopes that provinces break from the center, forever ending the power of the regime. In this scenario, the United States would need to make a hard choice: End the economic pain and try to create stability, despite incomplete change, or finish the job the United States and Israel started together.

It is also worth restating the obvious: The enemy gets a vote. Iranian leadership has built a nearly 50-year-old regime on the back of a radical ideology. Some may consider betraying that ideology a fate worse than death. It takes two sides to end the fighting. What's left of the Iranian leadership can decide to capitulate, negotiate, or fight on, no matter what.

War involves a million choices, but the biggest one is always what the protagonists seek to accomplish. The United States and Israel will need to take a step back from tactical decisions and seriously evaluate their strategic goals. Is destruction of missiles, the navy, and the nuclear program enough, even if that outcome is temporary? Or are they willing to commit to the immense economic and military costs of going further?

Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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