Shared Confidence, Diverging Expectations in the Taiwan Strait

Americans and Taiwanese see US power as superior to Beijing's, and China's rise as a major threat to both countries. Yet Americans remain more cautious about direct military involvement, even as both sides prefer maintaining the cross-strait status quo.

Results from the 2025 Chicago Council Survey in the United States and the 2025 Taiwan National Defense Surveys find that majorities of both American and Taiwanese publics are confident in US military superiority over China and view China's rise as a critical threat to their nations. However, Americans are somewhat more reluctant to commit US forces to a conflict with China than Taiwanese would like. And ultimately, Americans and Taiwanese would prefer to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait than push Taipei toward independence or unification. Given this shared preference despite differing preferences in a crisis scenario, policymakers in Washington and Taipei alike will have to manage Taiwanese public expectations against practical assessments of US policy.

Key Findings

• Both Taiwanese (60%) and Americans (53%) say the United States is militarily stronger than China.
• The Taiwanese public (60%) is far more confident that American economic power surpasses China's than are Americans (34%).
• Taiwanese (55%) are only slightly more likely than Americans (50%) to say the development of China as a world power is a critical threat to their countries.
• Three-quarters of Taiwanese (73%) and half of Americans (50%) say Taiwan should maintain the status quo.
• Majorities of Taiwanese expect that the United States would provide-and majorities of Americans support providing-food, medical, and military aid to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
• Half of Taiwanese (51%) expect the United States to send troops to aid Taipei should China invade; only 43 percent of Americans favor this.
• Americans are slightly more likely to favor using the US Navy to break a Chinese blockade of Taiwan (47%) than Taiwanese are to expect such a move (41%).

Cross-Strait Policy: Taiwanese and Americans Support Status Quo

When asked about what Taiwan's policy should be toward mainland China, a large majority of Taiwanese (73%) say Taiwan should maintain the status quo, not moving toward independence or unification. Half of Americans (50%) express the same preference. About one-third of Americans (35%) believe Taiwan should move toward independence, even if it risks provoking a war with China-a position supported by only 16 percent of Taiwanese. Support for Taiwan moving closer to unification with China is limited in both places, with just 4 percent of Taiwanese and 6 percent of Americans favoring this option even if it worsens US-Taiwan relations.

Taiwanese Expectations and American Preferences in Crisis Situation

For all the discussions of US-Taiwan security relations in recent years, how the United States would respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unclear as the official US government position remains one of "strategic ambiguity."

In the event of a crisis, the American public favors-and the Taiwanese public expects-providing aid to Taiwan. If China were to invade Taiwan, 72 percent of Taiwanese believe the United States would provide additional military arms and supplies, while 63 percent of Americans say they would support such assistance. Americans show strong support for humanitarian measures: 77 percent favor using the US military to airlift food and medical supplies to Taiwan, compared with 69 percent of Taiwanese who think such an action is likely.

Support declines for measures that could involve direct military confrontation. Among Americans, 43 percent would support sending US troops to help Taiwan defend itself, and 47 percent would support using the US Navy to break a Chinese blockade around Taiwan. Taiwanese express similar caution: 51 percent believe the United States would send troops to help defend Taiwan, and an even smaller proportion, 41 percent, think the US Navy would be used to break a Chinese blockade around Taiwan.

Taken as a whole, the data suggest that Americans and Taiwanese broadly agree on US assistance in a crisis, though critical differences remain on direct US involvement in a potential cross-strait conflict. Those differences have narrowed over the past year, as Americans have become more likely to favor direct intervention. Americans are 10 percentage points more likely today than in 2024 to say the United States should use the US Navy to break a Chinese blockade of Taiwan even at the risk of triggering a direct US-China conflict. American support for sending US troops to Taiwan has also risen, up seven percentage points over the past year.

Taiwanese Seek Greater US Support; Americans Unsure but Supportive

When asked about a range of potential US policies toward Taiwan, the Taiwanese express far stronger support than Americans on questions about the political status of the island. Much of this gap reflects high levels of uncertainty among Americans: For every policy surveyed, at least four in 10 Americans selected "not sure." Outside of a potential free trade agreement, none of the listed US-Taiwan policies receive majority support from the American public, reflecting the far lower prominence of these issues in the American public debate. Those Americans who do provide a response tend to be supportive of Taiwan across various domains, with relatively few opposing the policies in question.

The largest divide appears on the policy of the US committing to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion. While 76 percent of Taiwanese support such a commitment, only 38 percent of Americans say the same. This is slightly lower than the proportion of Americans who favor sending US forces to aid Taipei in the event of a Chinese invasion, perhaps reflecting public hesitancy about creating additional formal US defense commitments. Additionally, across various scenarios in the Council's years of polling, Americans have consistently hesitated to engage in a conflict with China likely because such a conflict would provide very costly.

The gap is somewhat smaller when it comes to the US signing a free trade agreement with Taiwan, with 77 percent of Taiwanese people supporting such an agreement compared with 51 percent of Americans. Still, the strongest support in Taiwan appears on the issue of international participation: 86 percent of Taiwanese favor US support for Taiwan's inclusion in international organizations, compared with 46 percent of Americans.

Finally, the two publics hold differing views about the desirability of the United States recognizing Taiwan as an independent country. While seven in 10 Taiwanese (72%) favor the United States doing so, just four in 10 Americans (42%) agree. Question wording is an additional factor that pushes American and Taiwanese views in different directions. The survey fielded in the United States mentions that a conflict with China could result as a consequence of recognizing an independent Taiwan.

Power Perceptions: Taiwanese More Confident in America than Americans

When asked to compare American and Chinese military and economic power, the Taiwanese public is consistently more confident in the United States than are Americans.

Americans and Taiwanese generally perceive the United States as militarily stronger than China. A majority of the public in both nations hold this view: 53 percent of Americans and 60 percent of Taiwanese. Americans (34%) are more likely than Taiwanese (22%) to say the United States and China have about equal military power, while only small minorities in either country believe China's military power surpasses that of the United States (11% of Americans, 9% of Taiwanese).

Though Americans and Taiwanese assess US and Chinese economic power similarly, they differ more sharply on relative military strength. Six in 10 Taiwanese (60%) believe the United States holds stronger economic power-a percentage identical to their assessment of US military power-but Americans are far less unified. Only about one-third of Americans (34%) say the United States is economically stronger, and the remaining two-thirds are divided between those who see China as having greater economic power (33%) and those who view the two countries as about equal economically (31%).

Threat Perceptions: Taiwanese More Concerned about China, Economy, Climate

Finally, while half of Americans (50%) and a slightly higher percentage of Taiwanese (55%) view the development of China as a world power as a critical threat, China isn't the thing either public is most concerned about. The Taiwanese public expresses significantly greater concern about global issues such as a potential economic downturn (68%) and climate change (64%). About half of Americans (49%) view each of those as critical threats. For their part, the American public is more focused on domestic challenges, including US government corruption (73%) and weaking democracy in the United States (65%).

Conclusion

The survey results show that Americans and Taiwanese generally share similar expectations about security in the Taiwan Strait. In both societies, most people prefer to maintain the status quo, and majorities support some form of US assistance to Taiwan if a conflict breaks out. These shared views offer a useful starting point for strengthening diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, while also helping reduce the uncertainty that often surrounds the future of US-Taiwan relations. This common ground matters, especially in Taiwan, where discussions about unreliable US commitments or "abandonment" still circulate and shape public perceptions. Public expectations in both democracies-on stability in the Taiwan Strait and on possible US responses-can influence how policymakers think and act. The general positive inclination Americans have toward Taiwan, tempered with concerns about additional security commitments and little specific knowledge of Taiwan's challenges, mean that American policymakers have both room to maneuver and a lot of work to do when it comes to informing and engaging the public. Additionally, understanding the preference for the status quo in both countries should encourage both Taipei and Washington to keep the relationship on an even keel.

At the same time, the data make clear that important gaps remain. Taiwanese expectations about direct US military involvement are consistently higher than what Americans say they would support. Narrowing these gaps will require clearer strategic communication between Washington and Taipei, particularly on what forms of US assistance are more realistic in a crisis. Highlighting strong American support for certain actions-such as breaking a blockade or providing humanitarian and military supplies-could help strengthen Taiwanese confidence while also making the public more aware of the rising hybrid threats Taiwan faces. As Taiwan continues to build resilience through its whole-of-society approach to civil defense, aligning public expectations with practical assessments of US support and emerging security challenges will be increasingly important.