The unlikely ally: why Brussels may soon prefer Westminster to some of its own capitals

By Jon Rhodes

There is a Brexit irony taking shape. Britain is outside the EU, yet Andy Burnham's brand of politics may soon look more attractive in Brussels than that of some leaders inside it.

The Financial Times this week set out how elections over the next 18 months could reshape Europe, bringing right-wing, Eurosceptic leaders closer to power in several major member states. For the European Commission, that creates a problem. At a time when cooperation on defence, security and growth matters more than ever, some of its most difficult political relationships may be with its own members.

Burnham offers a contrast: pragmatic, pro-European, committed to defence and focused on economic growth. He is not (yet) arguing for Britain to rejoin the EU. But he is arguing that working with Europe makes sense. That could make him a useful ally in Brussels - and create an opening to repair a relationship that has spent a decade mired in mutual suspicion.

Kemi Badenoch was right to remind Burnham, in the House of Commons this week, that the EU negotiates hard. After the 2016 referendum, Brussels had a clear political interest in ensuring Brexit did not look like a success. For many officials the mantra seemed to be that Britain should suffer economically, even if the EU suffered too; provided Britain suffered more. Exporters across Europe felt the consequences in paperwork, delays and lost business.

But the political calculations have changed. The EU now faces growing resistance to integration from within, while Britain has a government broadly committed to closer cooperation. Brussels may have more to gain from finding solutions with Britain than from continuing to make an example of its departure.

Three things matter here.

First, the politics. A more Eurosceptic European Council could make agreement on everything from migration to defence harder. The Commission needs partners willing to work across borders, not leaders looking for reasons to obstruct. Burnham doesn't have a vote, but at least he represents a strand of politics that treats European cooperation as an asset rather than a concession.

Second, economics. Neither side has resolved its growth problem. Britain has struggled to generate growth; Europe faces an investment gap and intensifying competition from the US and China. Adding friction to trade with a wealthy neighbour makes little sense when both economies need to become more productive. Closer cooperation would not reverse Brexit, but it could reduce some of its costs.

Third, and perhaps most critically, defence. Russia's war against Ukraine and uncertainty over American security commitments have changed the calculation. Britain remains a major European defence power, with significant intelligence capabilities and an advanced defence industry. Europe cannot easily strengthen its security while keeping Britain at arm's length. The incentive to find practical arrangements is stronger than it was a decade ago.

None of this means Brussels will offer Britain an easy ride. The single market remains a red line, and closer access will often require closer alignment with EU rules. But the argument for preserving unnecessary barriers is getting harder to sustain.

For business, the opportunity is practical rather than political. Easier trade in food could cut border costs and delays. Greater alignment on energy and carbon rules could reduce duplication. Defence cooperation could open opportunities in joint procurement, although EU preferences for European production could remain a constraint. Mobility arrangements could help businesses recruit and move skills across borders, though immigration politics will make progress difficult.

None of these are easy wins. Each requires negotiation and compromise. And that is Burnham's challenge: turning a more constructive political mood into a credible offer. Brussels will want to know what Britain is prepared to commit to, not simply what it hopes to receive. And closer integration will mean choices about rules and sovereignty that politicians cannot wish away.

But, I am cautiously optimistic. Not because the EU has forgotten Brexit, but because the politics around it are changing. Not because Brussels has become easier to negotiate with, but because the reasons for refusing compromise have weakened while the costs of failing to cooperate have risen. As the European centre comes under pressure from the right, both Brussels and Westminster may have more to gain from finding common ground than from proving the other wrong.