Arms Trade Treaty Working Group Meetings - EU Key Messages - Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation

Arms Trade Treaty Working Group Meetings - EU Key Messages - Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation

EU Key Messages

Arms Trade Treaty Working Group Meetings

Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation

Geneva, 16-19 March 2026

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Republic of Moldova, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Sub-working Group on Exchange of National Implementation Practices

Agenda item 2: National control system - Brokering

• Even though the focus of the discussion is national systems, the EU finds it potentially useful to share elements of regulations of arms brokering which are common to the 27 EU Member States under the EU Council Common Position of 23 June 2003:

1. Member States share a common definition of arms brokering: brokering activities are activities of persons and entities: 1) negotiating or arranging transactions that may involve the transfer of items under the EU Common Military List (which also includes the entire scope of items covered by the ATT) from a third country to any other third country, or 2) who buy, sell, or arrange the transfer of such items that are in their ownership from a third country to any other third country.

2. Member States are obliged to take all necessary measures to control brokering activities taking place within their territory and are encouraged to consider controlling brokering activities outside of their territory carried out by brokers of their nationality resident or established in their territory. The license or written authorization shall be obtained in a Member State where the activities will take place, and, when required by national legislation, where the broker is resident or established. The criteria used for assessing applications are the same as for licenses for arms exports, which, in the case of the EU, is the EU Common Position 2008/944, last amended in 2025.

The measures to implement these obligations, as well as any other measures to regulate arms brokering beyond these obligations are taken nationally by EU Member States.

1. Member States also must keep records for at least 10 years for licenses or authorizations granted and may use the EU system for confidential data exchange on arms exports to share information about denials of registering applications (if applicable) and licensing applications.

2. To support transparency in the arms trade, Member States collectively publish, as a part of the EU annual report on arms exports, information about the number and value of brokering licenses issued, destinations, EU Common Military List categories covered, quantity and value of brokered items and the country of their origin.

• The EU stands ready to support States Parties, free of charge, on any matter covered by the ATT under the comprehensive EU ATT Outreach Program, subject to detailed arrangement about modalities of the support.

Sub-working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues

Agenda item 2: Challenges related to the scope of the Treaty and the establishment and maintenance of a national control list

• Let me reiterate the EU's appreciation to the Chair for structuring this discussion in a good way. We find it very helpful that detailed guidance was provided on how to frame the inputs.

• With reference to the guiding questions, let me recall the EU's experience with adoption and operation of the legally binding EU Common Military List, which is a transposition of the Wassenaar Arrangement's Munitions List to the EU law, and is binding on EU Member States. To have direct effect for natural and legal persons in legal systems of EU Member States, it must be transposed into national legislation. It may be supplemented by additional elements on the national level, thereby forming the common part of possibly broader national control lists.

• The EU Common Military List is more detailed than the categories in Article 2(1) of the ATT. It covers parts and components, in addition to other elements that may contribute to the capability of acquiring or domestically manufacturing arms and ammunition, such as manufacturing machinery, blueprints and know-how. As such, the EU Common Military List is also well suited to address challenges related to the ATT scope. The EU believes that the EU Common Military List offers a good standard for the approximation of national lists. As it is also based on the Wassenaar Munitions List that is being operated by 39 States Parties to the ATT, it is a natural point of departure for any reflections on updating the Treaty, should States Parties decide so. We also see high value in the EU Common Military List, or the Wassenaar Munitions List, serving as a template in case further development of the Voluntary Basic Guide is authorized.

• The EU's offer of technical assistance to partner States under the EU ATT Outreach programme also includes assistance in establishing national control lists, if and as requested. The latest example, since CSP11, is the launch of the national process and national workshop for Togo held in February.

• Let me also re-emphasize the value of common control lists for facilitating the tracking of arms transfers, and for transparency and confidence. We would like to reiterate the value of exploring, within the ATT process, the possibilities of promoting the adoption of uniform or coherent control lists regionally among States Parties who still do not have them.

• In such context, the EU welcomes the suggestion of establishing an informal group of interested States and stakeholders to reflect on the issues of control lists and scope, and stands ready to contribute to that reflection as appropriate.

• The EU also supports closer engagement with the World Customs Organization in recognition of value of their perspective and practical experience in operation of control lists by customs authorities.

Agenda item 3: the role of industry in responsible international arms transfers

• The EU wishes to reiterate its support to the potential creation of voluntary guidance for industry. Its creation at the ATT level, and its potential adoption by a future CSP, would address the already visible willingness of the industry to have governmental or government-validated indications about acceptable standards and methods. Development of national guidance in each instance may be a time-consuming and technically complicated exercise, especially for States with smaller industries, and as such, the ATT guidance would be welcome by the broad community of stakeholders.

• Governments can also benefit from the existence of such guidance, since it will, among other things, improve the quality of licensing requests.

• We would like to thank the Chair for presenting the Possible draft Elements in Appendix 1. While not commenting about the existing elements which are valid, the EU would like to share thoughts about possible structuring and grouping of the elements. It would be useful to structure the guidance about capabilities to be achieved and processes to be followed.

  • As regards capabilities, the guidance should emphasize the downstream traceability, a critical tool to combat illicit diversion to unauthorized users, as it enables verification of the destination and end use of products. This can be achieved through weapons marking, end-user certificates, and as a side aspect of the cooperation between manufacturers and/or maintenance providers and end users throughout the life cycle.

  • As regards processes, the guidance should, in the spirit of dialogue and awareness-raising, provide a set of best practices, such as at what point to seek views of end users and governments potentially involved, and whom to approach.

  • Furthermore, risk assessment methodology for the purpose of Articles 6 and 7 could be patterned as a set of guiding principles, minimum standards, sources for reference. In some aspects, the publicly available User's Guide for EU licensing officers could provide useful food for thought. The scope of responsibilities of industry from question 7 is both ideal and ambitious and should find its place among leading principles.

• The EU wishes to use this opportunity to present an update regarding ongoing outreach: in September, the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) conducted a National Outreach to Industry Workshop in Chile that brought together key national industry stakeholders.

Agenda item 4: The risk of conventional arms being used for GBV or VAWC

• The EU wishes to express support for the present (amended) version of the guidance on Art. 7(4) and its integration into the Voluntary Guide on Art. 6 & 7.

• Let me use this opportunity to inform about EU outreach efforts to address the GBV in the context of the ATT: in November, Expertise France under the EU ATT Outreach Project, 4^th Phase, in collaboration with the Small Arms Survey, organised a Train-the-Trainers workshop in Paris on the implementation of the ATT's provisions related to GBV, for practitioners from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mexico, focusing on how to translate the ATT's obligations into concrete risk assessment processes and national transfer control practices.

Agenda item 5: Developing or strengthening inter-agency cooperation

• The EU expresses support to the Chair's proposal to integrate the existing "set of possible steps and questions" into the Voluntary Basic Guide to Establishing a National Control System.

Agenda item 6: Ad hoc discussions on current and emerging implementation issues

1. Risk assessment of arms exports to Sudan:

• The EU strongly condemns the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which, for a fourth consecutive year, continues to cause the loss of thousands of lives and immense hardship for the Sudanese people, and poses a serious threat to stability and security across the wider region.

• The EU is extremely concerned about the unity, territorial integrity and stability of Sudan, which are at serious risk, with increasing fragmentation along political and ethnic lines. The EU is gravely concerned by the widespread and well-documented violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law across Sudan. The EU unequivocally condemns all such atrocities, many of which have been employed systematically and at an alarming scale and have had a devastating impact on the civilian population, particularly on women and children as well as persons in vulnerable situations.

• The EU underscores the critical importance of ensuring accountability for all violations of international law, including violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Persisting impunity breeds new atrocities. The report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan found that both parties to the conflict violated international law, amounting to international crimes, with the Rapid Support Forces having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity and the Sudanese Armed Forces having committed violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, which also amount to war crimes. The EU remains committed to supporting efforts to document and investigate such violations.

• The EU underscores that the primary responsibility for ending the conflict lies with the leadership of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, as well as those providing them with support.

• The EU urges all parties to uphold their obligations under IHL and human rights law by using every possible measure to protect civilians and civilian objects.

• The EU also urges all external actors supplying arms, financial support, or support of any other kind to the warring parties to immediately cease such support and to comply with the UN arms embargo. Since 2014, the EU itself has been maintaining a more comprehensive arms embargo covering all entities in the entire territory of Sudan, with standard humanitarian and international assistance-related exemptions.

• The EU reaffirms the necessity of a robust and prudent arms export policy underpinned by strict controls, non-intervention into internal affairs of States, and no direct nor indirect trade with non-State actors. We urge all States Parties to ensure adherence to ATT obligations through implementation of robust arms export policies.

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   North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.