New Thai Prime Minister and the Fall of the Shinawatras

Critical Questions by Japhet Quitzon and Gregory B. Poling

Published September 15, 2025

Thailand's parliament on September 7 elected Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party, as prime minister after months of political turmoil. As the third prime minister in just over a year, Anutin will lead a minority government with the two largest parties, the People's Party and Pheu Thai, in opposition. A long-time figure in Thai politics, Anutin has waited in the wings for decades before maneuvering his way to the premiership-for now. He has pledged to call a new election within four months.

Meanwhile, the future of Pheu Thai, which led the previous government under ousted prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, is unclear. Since its inception, the party has been a vehicle for Paetongtarn's father, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. But he has begun a one-year prison sentence handed down by the Thai Supreme Court.

Q1: How did Anutin take the reins?

A1: Bhumjaithai had been the second-largest party in Pheu Thai's uneasy coalition government since its formation in 2023. That had earned Anutin the powerful position of interior minister. But it was an uneasy alliance between Pheu Thai and its more conservative partners, including Bhumjaithai. A public split was already emerging in June when Cambodian Senate president Hun Sen lobbed a grenade into Thai politics, leaking the audio of a phone call he had with Paetongtarn over ongoing border clashes. In the audio, Paetongtarn seemed overly deferential to the Cambodian leader and critical of the Thai military. This provoked a storm of public outrage that she had undermined Thai interests. Bhumjaithai withdrew from the coalition that same day, leaving the coalition with a razor-thin majority.

On July 1, Thailand's Constitutional Court temporarily suspended Paetongtarn over the phone call. The coalition limped on for another two months under caretaker prime minister Phumtham Wechayachai. Then, on August 29, the Thai Supreme Court officially removed Paetongtarn from office. The only eligible candidates with a clear path to replace her were Pheu Thai's next nominee, Chaikasem Nitsiri, and Anutin. Gaining the support of the People's Party, the third incarnation of Thailand's growing progressive movement, which held the largest number of seats in parliament at 143, would be crucial to forming a new government.

Both parties made rapid overtures to the People's Party-ironic since the only thing that brought Bhumjaithai and the other conservative parties into the coalition two years ago was their belief that the People's Party was an even greater threat than Pheu Thai. The People's Party vowed to stay in opposition but said it would vote for a new prime minister on several conditions, most importantly that he agree to dissolve parliament within four months. The People's Party also demanded that the winning prime minister refrain from attempting to form a majority government and instead pave the way for a constitutional referendum to revisit the military-sponsored 2017 Thai constitution. Bhumjaithai agreed to these conditions, as it seems, did Pheu Thai. But in the end, the People's Party's distrust of Pheu Thai was greater, and it threw its support behind Anutin.

In a last-ditch attempt to block Anutin's elevation, Pheu Thai threatened to immediately dissolve parliament. But it reportedly failed to secure royal assent from the Privy Council for that move. And so, on September 3, the People's Party and Bhumjaithai signed formal documents cementing the deal that would guarantee the former's votes for Anutin. Now out of power, Pheu Thai has few options, though it may use its weight as the second-largest party in parliament to force a vote of no confidence in Anutin's government in hopes of diminishing its public standing ahead of the impending elections.

Q2: What is Anutin's new government likely to prioritize?

A2: Anutin, a U.S.-educated engineer, is well-known for his role as health minister during the Covid-19 pandemic, his driving presence in Thailand's cannabis legalization movement, and for two stints as interior minister under Pheu Thai prime ministers Srettha Thavisin and Paetongtarn. He takes the reins amid economic uncertainty and complicated geopolitics. Wage inequality and rising costs of living remain issues for everyday Thai citizens, generating widespread public discontent. Meanwhile, tensions continue to flare between Thailand and Cambodia over disputed border territory despite a ceasefire brokered in July.

Stabilizing Thailand's foreign relations and signaling confidence in the economy will be crucial to Anutin's administration. His deep connections to Thai business, influence with Thailand's conservative elite, and strong ties with grassroots movements in Bhumjaithai's bailiwick in northeast Thailand give him unique leverage across party lines. Urging unity amid crisis, Anutin tapped veteran politicians to lead the treasury and foreign ministry in an attempt to ease Thailand's financial turmoil and improve relations with Cambodia. Anutin will likely use his reputation as a pragmatic politician focused on results to grow Bhumjaithai's numbers ahead of a snap election and secure greater leverage in the next fight for the premiership.

Q3: With Paetongtarn deposed and Thaksin sentenced to prison, what will become of the Shinawatra family?

A3: The Shinawatra family has been a mainstay in Thai politics since 1998 and is the major force behind Pheu Thai. A Shinawatra or a Shinawatra-affiliated politician has successfully won the premiership six times; however, on each occasion, military or judicial intervention removed the prime minister. Paetongtarn's ouster and Bhumjaithai's rise put the Shinawatra dynasty's future in jeopardy.

Pheu Thai failed to secure support for Chaikasem in parliament and will be relegated to the opposition. Populist policies championed by the party, such as Srettha and Paetongtarn's digital wallet program, failed to create popular momentum in its favor. Achieving success in the snap election could prove daunting for Pheu Thai, weighed down by scandal and its inability to deliver concrete results. To further complicate matters, Thaksin Shinawatra, patriarch of the family, was sentenced on September 9 to one year in prison by the Thai Supreme Court. The judges found that Thaksin's medical stay in a hospital upon his return to Thailand in August 2023 after years of self-imposed exile was insufficient to meet the terms of a royal amnesty that required him to serve a year in prison. Thaksin has been an energetic force in drumming up support for the Pheu Thai Party since his return to the country. With him imprisoned and Paetongtarn deposed, the Shinawatra family faces a period of significantly diminished influence in Thailand.

Q4: What do recent events mean for the U.S.-Thai relationship?

A4: Since Paetongtarn's suspension on July 1, Thailand has been without a permanent prime minister to navigate U.S.-Thailand tariff negotiations. Still, officials were able to negotiate tariff rates down to 19 percent. With the snap election just months away, Anutin has a small window to make his mark, especially on the U.S.-Thailand relationship. U.S. President Donald Trump, known to favor countries based on positive relationships with their leaders, may find some common ground with Anutin, a long-time businessman.

Successive Thai governments have tried to maintain close ties with the United States economically and militarily, with mixed results in recent years. The bilateral relationship had been on the upswing from 2019 to 2025, after going into a malaise following Thailand's last coup in 2014. But in the first months of the Trump administration, ties took a sharp downward turn, driven particularly by the Paetongtarn government's decision to deport a group of Uyghur asylum seekers to China. Fences appear mended since Trump claimed an important role in securing the Malaysia-brokered ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand, and Anutin will have opportunities to accelerate that momentum. Facing domestic and international pressure to take action on scam centers on the Thailand-Myanmar border, Anutin could find common ground with the Trump administration's measures to tackle the issue. But there will be limits on how much a lame duck government can do with an election on the way in just a few months-an election from which the People's Party is likely to perform best. How Thailand's military, business, and government elites will react to that is unknown, but they went to great lengths in 2023 to block the progressive party from forming a government.

Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Gregory B. Poling is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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