HASC-SF Fiscal Year 2027 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing

BACON: Today's hearing will come to order. Good to see you there, Mr. Bolton.

Good afternoon and welcome to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's first hearing of the 2027 Fiscal Year Posture Season. I am filling in for the Chair, who is still in transit, trying to get here, but I am proud to be a part of this committee.

First, I want to welcome all the members back to the best subcommittee here on the House Armed Services Committee, with maybe the exception of Cyber. They have a little better chairman on the Cyber Subcommittee.

I look forward to working with you all again as we build the National Defense Authorization Act. As you see here today, the Joint Force is conducting operations in the Middle East against the Iranian threat. We do not take for granted the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, and that is why it is more important than ever that we make sure they have the best or have what they need and when they need it.

I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. With us we have Mr. Mark Berkowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and Dr. Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense, someone who I have worked with extensively over the last few years.

General Stephen Whiting, Commander of the U.S. Space Command; General Gregory Guillot, who at one time commanded the best wing in the Air Force, now Commander of the U.S. Northern Command; and Admiral Richard Correll, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command at one of the best bases in America right there at Offutt.

General Whiting and General Guillot, it's good to see you again. A special welcome to Admiral Correll, Mr. Berkowitz, Dr. Kadlec in their first appearance for the subcommittee.

As we await the president's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, we look forward to hearing from each of you about the complex threats you are seeing in your areas of responsibility and the capabilities you need to address them.

Space plays a vital role in everything the Joint Force does, and it's more apparent now than ever. GPS jamming has become a common occurrence in every recent conflict from Ukraine to now as we've seen in Iran. How we fight and posture our space assets is central to the success -- of the success of the mission both here and abroad in defense of the homeland.

General Whiting, I look forward to hearing from you -- from you how this increasingly threatened space domain has factored to your plans to both support the Joint Force but also break red kill chains.

I was happy to see the administration's national defense strategy recognize that nuclear threats are growing, particularly with China's rapid nuclear build-up and emphasize the need for a robust and modern nuclear deterrent. However, while our strategy may recognize that threats have changed, we continue to field a deterrent designed for a bipolar nuclear world and to pursue a modernization plan that was developed nearly a decade before China's nuclear breakout began.

Dr. Kadlec and Admiral Correll, I look forward to hearing from you about what changes are needed to adapt to the current threat environment? And what additional capabilities are necessary to prevent deterrence gaps?

General Guillot, as the warfighter responsible for homeland defense, you stand at the intersection of all the subcommittee's mission areas, nuclear deterrence, space operations, and missile defense.

While many of us continue to have questions about how the Golden Dome architecture will address your needs for domain awareness and defense capabilities, I know General Guillot is working hard to finalize the plan and there's only so much can we discuss at this time.

With that, I'll turn it over to the Ranking Member Moulton, for any remarks he'd like to make.

MOULTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I had all these nice things I was going to say about the real chairman. I'll have to take a look and see if -- well, actually, they apply even more so to you. So, thank you very much for your partnership, a long-time partnership on this -- on this committee. We're going to miss you.

BACON: Thank you.

MOULTON: I also want to welcome our witnesses and thank you for your continued service to our country.

It's a difficult time. We seem to have a new war every few weeks. But before we begin, I want to take a moment to especially welcome Admiral Correll, Dr. Kadlec, and Mr. Berkowitz on the subcommittee as this is our final hearing with you.

Get that right? First hearing with you. Did not get it right.

The policy and programmatic issues in front of us are some of the most consequential that we face as a nation. And we must continue to work together to ensure the department is a good steward of the taxpayers' money, but also because the world we will leave our children depends on it.

I also would like to thank General Guillot as this will be his final posture hearing in front of this committee. I have always appreciated your thoughtful and measured approach as the head of NORTHCOM and NORAD, and your leadership there will be missed.

The responsibilities of this committee encompassing our space, missile defenses, and nuclear forces form the foundation of security in America. So, the issues before us should be debated rigorously and honestly. On that count, I'm going to be blunt speaking not just as a senior member of this committee, but as a four-tour veteran of a misguided war in the Middle East.

We simply cannot ignore the fact that as we sit here today, America is more at risk than we were before the Iran war began, both in the Middle East and here at home. We should all hope for a miracle, but miracles are not strategies, and it's very difficult to see our way forward right now.

Since taking office 14 months ago, the so-called President of Peace has attacked seven countries. And through these conflicts of choice, has expended scarce munitions and emboldened both Russia and China. He has sought regime change in both Venezuela and Iran and failed twice. Maduro's regime is now headed by his vice president.

In Iran, we've succeeded in replacing an 86-year-old in failing health with his son in his 50s. And in case you wondered whether he was more or less hardline, we killed his wife and his son.

It's hard to imagine a better way to turn the pro-American Iranian people against us than raining down bombs from the sky and killing at least 187 innocent civilians, most of them little schoolgirls. But Trump did find a better way -- doing it with the Israelis.

And now, implausibly, with the Strait of Hormuz closed and oil prices skyrocketing, Trump is actually losing the war. He has kicked a hornet's nest and gotten his Florsheim-shoed foot stuck in it.

Russia is happily helping Iran target American troops. Some Democrats criticized Trump for enforcing oil sanctions on the high seas, I did not. I said it was long overdue, especially against Russia's so-called dark fleet. But now, as if to thank the Russians for targeting Americans, Trump is rewarding Putin by lifting the oil sanctions and giving him more money to fight Ukraine and build out its nuclear arsenal.

I can't imagine what our troops who risked their lives to board those ships a few weeks ago are thinking now, except that I can imagine what they're thinking because I lived through similar harebrained decisions in Iraq. The president is now appealing to both China and Russia for help. That's how bad it is.

You can't make this up, and yet it's no fairy tale. The cost is paid in the lives of brave young Americans, willing to serve as the president was not, as well as by children and innocent civilians.

Against this backdrop of self-inflicted geopolitical idiocy, the mission we are discussing in this hearing is increasingly important. It represents the backstop against our worst day, even as the threat is growing in scope, importance, and urgency.

The Chinese Communist Party's ICBM fleet continues to exceed U.S. intelligence estimates, and they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear weapons warheads.

Russia has developed a treaty violating space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all the satellites we rely on for GPS and communications every day. And again, as a reminder, we're lifting sanctions on Russia, the only country with the capability to completely destroy the United States.

Last year, I spoke at a defense conference about how dangerous the president's Golden Dome idea is for strategic deterrence, instigating an arms race where our adversaries develop weapons to get around it.

When I came off the stage, my team told me that the senior Republican speaking after me had just asked his staff to ask ChatGPT why Golden Dome is good. Again, you can't make this up.

I don't know if ChatGPT has come up with a better answer yet or not, but I do know that the Russians are developing multiple weapons systems to attack the U.S. that will be not -- that will not be defended effectively by Golden Dome years before we will ever see anything fielded.

Never before has Congress spent so much money on something so ineffective with no strategy whatsoever, though, I guess the Iran war could give Golden Dome a run for that record.

Now, for the first time since the Cold War, we are living in a world with no agreement to constrain nuclear weapons. And that is to our disadvantage because, to be clear, our adversaries have and are building more than we are. I don't know if that's the art of the deal or not.

With everything going wrong in the Middle East, it's easy to lose focus on America's strategic defense, but it remains the bedrock of our national security and must remain a top priority. Even the right weapons with the wrong policy can be destabilizing, weakening our security.

We need strength, not chaos. We need weapons to deter our enemies, not recruit more. We need defenses that work to defend the country, not bankrupt us. And we need leaders focused on reducing the need for nuclear weapons, not stoking an arms race for even more.

I look forward to working closely with the members of the subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be safe, secure, and reliable, our country should be the same.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS: We'll now move to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared comments or statements will be made part of the record. We will have each five minutes to make some opening remarks.

Mr. Berkowitz, let's begin with you.

BERKOWITZ: Thank you.

Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee -- Congressman Moulton, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the Department's space and missile defense posture. It's an honor to appear alongside my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Kadlec, Admiral Correll, General Whiting, and General Guillot.

America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. Outer space is an increasingly complex and contested warfighting domain. Competitors have fielded and operate sophisticated arsenals of space, counter-space, missile, and integrated air and missile defense systems.

Indeed, as Secretary of War Hegseth has stated, space is the most important domain of warfare. The fight for space is a fight for the future of the world as we know it.

President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these challenges to secure peace. He issued an executive order which prioritizes the defense of U.S. vital interests to, in, and from space by ensuring America's space superiority.

The President also issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next-generation defense against the most catastrophic threats facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second-strike capability.

Space and missile defense forces are central to U.S. strategy. They help to ensure America has the world's most powerful, lethal, and advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and if necessary, win them quickly and decisively.

Access to and use of space is a U.S. vital interest because of its overriding importance to our security and economic prosperity. Space systems contribute to all elements of America's national power, and we will secure and defend our interests to, in, and from space.

Space assets enable strategic deterrence. They provide domain awareness, including access to denied and hostile territory, indications and warning, launch detection, command control and communications, detonation detection, and attack assessment.

The President's Golden Dome initiative is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It's a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as, other next-generation weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our nuclear deterrent.

Today, our capability to defend the nation is limited, and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense in depth of the United States.

Combined with the prospect of U.S. retaliation, it will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, the Golden Dome will save lives and limit damage should deterrence break down.

China is our pacing competitor. We will deter China from a position of strength, not confrontation, with the denial defense along the first island chain.

Space and missile defense capabilities are essential to this effort, because they enable the intelligence, command and control, and other warfighting functions needed to project power effectively across the Indo-Pacific region.

Our global alliances will remain a strategic advantage if our allies and partners invest properly in their defense. The Department will continue to pursue opportunities for space and missile defense cooperation to increase burden sharing, capacity, and interoperability.

We are also supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base by cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks, and leveraging private sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical space and missile defense capabilities at scale.

In closing, with the continued support of Congress, the War Department will invest in the space and missile defense posture necessary to achieve peace through strength.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

DESJARLAIS: Dr. Kadlec.

KADLEC: Thank you, Chairman DesJarlais and Ranking Member Moulton, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our nation's strategic posture.

U.S. strategy is at a critical inflection point. China's strategic nuclear breakout means we now face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers. This is not a distant problem. It's a central organizing challenge for our defense strategy today.

Compounding this external pressure are two additional factors, immense budgetary, industrial, and programmatic strains of modernizing at once the three legs of our nuclear triad and its command and control, and the expiration of the new START treaty this past February.

We must be clear-eyed about these threats we face. China is engaged in the most rapid and opaque nuclear expansion in its history. This nuclear build-up is coupled with a massive investment in theater-range delivery systems designed to hold U.S. forces, allies, and partners at risk in the Indo-Pacific. Force of this size and sophistication provides China with a spectrum of nuclear options to try to deter U.S. intervention and coerce a resolution of a conflict on China's terms.

Russia fields the world's largest arsenal and retains a doctrine that explicitly integrates nuclear weapons for regional coercion. Its ongoing modernization and development of novel systems, like Poseidon's Skyfall cruise missile, underscore its continued reliance on nuclear forces to offset conventional weaknesses.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy correctly identifies this new and more dangerous environment. To support that strategy, the reality is that our nuclear posture must be a credible backstop to our denial strategy, not a substitute for it.

In Asia, this means building a conventional force alongside our allies and partners capable of defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The role of our nuclear arsenal in this context is not to fight and win a nuclear war, but to deter China escalating to nuclear use in the first place, or from believing it can use its nuclear arsenal to coerce us into accepting (inaudible).

Our nuclear forces must provide the President with credible options to manage escalation, demonstrating that any nuclear use will be met with a response that leaves the adversary worse off. This requires a flexible and modern nuclear posture.

A solvent defense strategy also requires our allies and partners to carry their fair share of the conventional burden. U.S. nuclear extended deterrence is a powerful enabler of this, providing our allies in both Europe and in the Indo-Pacific region the critical security backstop they need to invest in their own conventional denial capabilities.

We must now plan for the real possibility of coordinated and -- or opportunistic aggression across multiple theaters. Our force structure, posture, and nuclear strategy must be robust, enough to deter both peers simultaneously even if we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one.

This does not mean we must match their combined arsenals, warhead for warhead. It means we require a nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency, either ensuring that neither believes that they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain.

To execute this strategy, our modernization programs are an urgent necessity. The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk.

There is no room for error. We must fully fund, and where possible, accelerate the Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia-class submarine, the B-21 bomber, and the LRSO cruise missile.

Critically, we must also field theater range nuclear options. SLCM-N is one example. It is essential and a vital tool for managing escalation in a conflict with a peer competitor.

We're entering in a -- into a new, more dangerous era. The luxury assuming a single major adversary is gone. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent is significant, but the cost of failing to do so is immeasurably greater.

Congress' continued support is essential to ensure we have the deterrent we need to preserve peace, protect our nation, and our freedom.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

DESJARLAIS: Thank you, Doctor. General Whiting, you're recognized.

WHITING: Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, it's an honor for Sergeant Major Stackpole and me to appear before you today, alongside Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, Assistant Secretary Kadlec, General Guillot and Chief Master Sergeant Storms, and Admiral Correll and Command Sergeant Major Naumann.

And I am privileged to testify before this subcommittee for a third time as the Commander of U.S. Space Command, representing the men and women who work tirelessly to ensure the United States maintains our dominance in space.

U.S. Space Command's area of responsibility is the ultimate high ground, from which we provide critical capabilities and overwatch that enhance joint force lethality.

In space, we also protect American interests from the threats now arrayed against our space systems to include our opponent's capabilities that allow them to conduct space-enabled attacks.

Thanks to the steadfast support of Congress, U.S. space capabilities, ranging from precision navigation and global communications, to missile warning and real-time intelligence, provide the joint force with unmatched precision, accuracy, reach, and lethality.

We saw the Joint Forces' unmatched integration of multi-domain capabilities in Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, and more recently, Operation Epic Fury, during which space effects were critical to mission success.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently highlighted, space and cyber forces were the first movers, employing layered, non-kinetic effects to enable freedom of maneuver for the joint force.

General Caine's remarks underscore the importance of achieving and maintaining space superiority, not only to safeguard the systems essential for precision strike, missile warning and tracking, and secure communications, but also to provide overwatch for terrestrial forces operating in harm's way.

Should an adversary degrade or destroy our space capabilities, the joint force's ability to fight as it is sized and designed would be immediately and materially impacted.

At U.S. Space Command, we command and control offensive and defensive space capabilities provided by the military services to conduct operations that set favorable conditions for our joint warfighters.

This operational imperative aligns with Secretary Hegseth's observation during his arsenal of freedom tour that, quote, "Space is the ultimate high ground and we must deliver supporting fires from our position of advantage to cover our maneuver forces," unquote.

Make no mistake, our opponents are moving at an alarming pace, developing and deploying capabilities to deny us the use of space. China has integrated space-enabled effects across its forces to make them more lethal, precise, and far-ranging while fielding weapons purpose-built to outmaneuver and destroy our satellites.

At the same time, Russia continues to demonstrate capabilities designed to disrupt our assets, including the potential placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, the single greatest threat to our space architecture. These developments threaten our joint force in every domain since the control of space shapes outcomes on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace.

To ensure U.S. Space Command can deter conflict and maintain dominance in space, we request continued congressional support of our key fiscal year 2027 priorities. This includes fielding integrated space fires, active protection of our high-value satellites, enhancing our battle space awareness, building an integrated command and control system, sustaining our forces' freedom to maneuver, and providing sufficient cyber defenses for our space enterprise.

We thank Congress for its support this past year, which has enabled us to begin the discipline transition to our permanent headquarters at Redstone Arsenal as directed by the President. To guarantee mission continuity, we are executing a phased relocation operating from interim facilities while a new purpose-built command and control facility is constructed.

Our people are central to this effort, and we are using retention and relocation incentives to keep our mission critical talent throughout the move. Your continued support and authorizations for FY 2026 and 2027 are essential to accelerate the completion of this modern headquarters and ensure our uninterrupted readiness. With the continued support of Congress, U.S. Space Command will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter-adversary actions, and safeguard America's interest in space today and for generations to come.

Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, but should deterrence fail, the integrated space power of our team will provide a decisive advantage. Thank you for your steadfast leadership and unwavering support to our mission. And Mr. Chairman, my posture statement has been submitted for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions.

DESJARLAIS: Thank you, General Whiting.

General Guillot, you are recognized.

GUILLOT: Good afternoon, Chairman DesJarlais, the ranking member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today along with my teammates to the left and right and represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

As the strategic environment has grown more complex, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have responded by fundamentally transforming both commands, taking on new missions, and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. From intercepting long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada, tracking advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America, or standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks, NORAD and USNORTHCOM remain vigilant, capable, and committed.

The commands have undertaken several initiatives over the last year to build on our preparedness to respond to any threat, including two that are particularly relevant to this subcommittee. In January 2026, USNORTHCOM activated Joint Task Force-Gold to serve as the operational arm for future layered defense system provided by Golden Dome for America. And USNORTHCOM developed a rapidly deployable counter-small UAS flyaway kit to defend military installations and critical infrastructure. Through exercises like Falcon Peak, we are also accelerating the development of new counter-UAS technologies in partnership with JIATF-401 and industry.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to pursue critical investments and modernize domain awareness systems and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow. The ability to detect, track, and discriminate threats from the seafloor to space is critical and I remain grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing support for space-based airborne moving target indicator, over the horizon radar, airborne early warning, and integrated undersea surveillance systems.

The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in our no-fail mission: disciplined defense of our homelands in all domains from all avenues of approach against all those who intend us harm. We appreciate the steadset -- excuse me, steadfast support of this committee and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch.

DESJARLAIS: Thank you, General Guillot.

Admiral Correll, you're recognized.

CORRELL: Good afternoon, Chairman DesJarlais, ranking member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee. Command Sergeant Major Naumann and I are honored to appear before you today alongside General Whiting, General Guillot, Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, and Assistant Secretary Kadlec.

Before I begin my prepared remarks, I'd like to take a moment to honor our fallen U.S. service members. The joint force is eternally grateful to those that pay the ultimate service -- price and service to our country.

This my first time addressing this committee as commander of U.S. strategic command and I want to express my gratitude for the committee's steadfast support. Your commitment to providing the resources necessary for us to execute our mission during this critical bigenerational period of modernization and recapitalization is deeply appreciated. I also extend my sincere thanks to the American people. Their unwavering support enables us to remain the most advanced lethal and credible fighting force in the world.

Our nuclear forces, the foundation of our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. My confidence does not come solely from our combat capabilities but from the professionals at U.S. strategic command, the very essence of our credibility. As I testify before you today, STRATCOM and its components stand ready not seeking out confrontation but deterring strategic attack and underpinning all Department of War operational plans.

The strategic capabilities provided by each leg of the triad, coupled with assured nuclear command control and communications or NC3 systems underpin everything the department does in defense of our nation and American interests abroad. Our fundamental challenge, one that we successfully face each and every day, is to deter great power conflict and to deter multiple nuclear competitors while simultaneously adapting to dramatic technological change.

This change is most evident in five evolving threat vectors: cyber, U.S.-based capabilities, a contested electromagnetic spectrum, novel missile systems, and supply chain challenges. Adapting to this changing environment requires constant vigilance, sustainment, and modernization of our strategic forces. As we bring the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system online, we will continue to ensure the credibility of our deterrence for decades to come.

Thank you again for your support and trust in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, guardians, and civilian professionals that comprise U.S. strategic command and for dedicating your time and effort to our mission and portfolio. I look forward to your questions

DESJARLAIS: Thank you, Admiral. I will know yield to myself for questions.

Dr. Kadlec, I'd like to share with you. Our nuclear strategy from the Cold War to the present has been remarkably consistent. Bad policy ideas such as countervalue targeting or no virtues (ph) policy have been rejected by presidents on both sides of the aisle and remain completely inconsistent with the threats we see today.

As I mentioned, as -- or General Bacon mentioned in my opening statement, I think the main question is whether we have sufficient capabilities to achieve our strategy in the new threat environment we face. I understand that the department will not be conducting a formal NPR, but can you talk about the follow-on work you will be doing to look at this question?

KADLEC: Well, thank you for the question, sir. And I just want to make sure that you understand that what we decided in the department, and this is undersecretary Colby working with Admiral Correll as to do a nuclear strategy review, which is really looking at some very specific issues as it relates to the two-peer problem, and that is the pace of modernization and sufficiency of what we have already in the programs of record. We're going to be taking a look at the theater nuclear forces issue as well, and also other factors that have been identified in the national defense strategy.

All of this is to come back to the president, and I think to the Congress to identify those things where there may need to be some changes or additions made. In previous conversations, people have asked about numbers, and I think this is the first opportunity to really evaluate the threat in a way that it's real and tangible with the commander of STRATCOM to actually see what we will need to have going forward. And again, that will identify areas for maybe expansion, but I will just pause and rem ember -- remind you of the strategic posture commission's findings is that what we have as far as program of records is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the two-peer threat.

DESJARLAIS: OK, thank you.

Mr. Berkowitz, the space domain faces similar challenges. Our adversaries are moving rapidly to counter our space capabilities and deploy their own and I don't think the previous administration responded sufficiently. I was disappointed that the national defense strategy had no discussion of space, which doesn't seem to reflect the president's longstanding prioritization of this domain with the creation of Space Force. How is the policy team working to set a strategy for space and align budgets to meet our objectives?

BERKOWITZ: Thank you for the question, Chairman. Space is absolutely essential to the security and defense of the United States. The president's executive order on ensuring American space superiority states very clearly that the defense department will take all the steps necessary to be able to detect, characterize, and counter threats to our interests, both from very low Earth orbit all the way to cislunar space, including the placement of a nuclear weapon in orbit.

Consistent with the president's direction, the national defense strategy's top two priorities, the defense of the homeland, and our ability to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region, are fundamentally enabled by our space capabilities and I look forward to the classified session so we can get into the details of what we're planning on doing there.

DESJARLAIS: OK, sounds good.

Admiral Correll, your predecessor strongly supported the SLCM-N program. Do you also agree this capability is extremely important?

CORRELL: I do. Ranking member DesJarlais, it's very important to address the deterrence challenge in front of us from my perspective, where the adversary is developing and fielding a range of theater nuclear capabilities. And so, our ability to have a capability that raises the threshold or decision calculus for the adversary for theater nuclear weapons is important.

DESJARLAIS: And I know we can talk about this a little more in the classified session as well. Dr. Kadlec, when we talk about nuclear modernization, we typically think about the major acquisition programs to recapitalize our triad, like Sentinel or Columbia, or our efforts to rebuild our production complex. While these programs are foundational to the future of our deterrent, they take decades to execute and cannot pace the dynamic security environment.

Can you talk about the importance of investing in tailored supplemental capabilities that can rapidly -- or be rapidly developed to complement the major modernization programs?

KADLEC: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for that question. The whole intent here, and there is efforts underway in a classified setting. We can talk a little bit more about them, particularly in the areas of theater of nuclear forces. That would represent some of our efforts to kind of get to capabilities that would be using the existing stockpile and existing platforms that are available to expand our capabilities rapidly.

DESJARLAIS: OK, my time's just about expired. But Admiral Correll, from a threat perspective, do you believe this is necessary? And can you also discuss how STRATCOM is working with Dr. Kadlec and the Nuclear Weapons Council to put this approach into practice?

CORRELL: Yes, Gentleman DesJarlais, we're working very closely with Mr. Kadlec and his team on the capabilities and prioritization of those capabilities. And we can discuss that more in a classified setting.

DESJARLAIS: And don't worry, generals, I got questions for you in the classified setting. I'll yield to my good friend and Ranking Member, Seth Moulton, for questions.

MOULTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Another chairman asked a great question to you, Mr. Berkowitz, about the prioritization of space strategy, which we've heard from the President is important, and yet that's not reflected in the budget. I mean, you can -- They say you can judge values by the budget, and the National Defense Strategy, of course, as well. Both the unclassified and the classified versions are completely silent on space.

Can you elaborate on why that is and what you're doing to rectify, given that, given the fact that we're spending billions of dollars on something the department can't even prioritize in the only strategy document that they have delivered to Congress thus far?

BERKOWITZ: Well, I appreciate the opportunity to correct the mischaracterization. In fact, the National Defense Strategy's classified report addresses space. So, it is addressed within the actual -- And (ph) say, in addition is -- in addition is that the interagency is in the process of conducting a broad range of activities to implement the President's executive order on ensuring American space superiority.

Part of that effort includes developing a new national security strategy for space security. As part of that, we will be -- that will be used to drive an architecture as well as a technology roadmap that will be reflected in the President's forthcoming budget request.

MOULTON: We look forward to seeing it. I mean, you have a subcommittee here that recognizes this is important and would very much like to invest in capabilities. And we'd love to see the prioritization, you know, commensurate with what we saw from previous administrations, including the first Trump administration. I'm not sure how you rank Venezuela in space, but to me, space is much more important.

In the National Defense Strategy, the department supposes to deal with simultaneity via burden sharing amongst allies. It's been the country's position for many years, across decades in fact, that global proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if amongst allies, is inherently destabilizing. It's hard not to correlate France's recent announcement to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal as not directly tied to President Trump's continued bashing of our European allies and questioning America's commitment to NATO.

Dr. Kadlec, can you please elaborate on how the department views burden sharing with regards to nuclear weapons?

KADLEC: Ranking Member Moulton, thank you for the question. I would just offer you the insights from Under Secretary Colby, who recognized that proliferation, even within our allies, is not something that we would accept or find beneficial.

And so, I think from the standpoint of France, they have an independent nuclear force that operates independently of NATO, and I think that's their choice to make. But as far as NATO members, I think Under Secretary Colby is on the record, whether it's in this chamber or in the Senate, saying very specifically about that it's not beneficial.

MOULTON: So, is there anything that the Secretary or the Department of Defense intends to do to alleviate France's concerns about our reliability in defending NATO so that they do not expand their arsenal?

KADLEC: Well, I think we've already done it. And Under Secretary Colby, again, is on-the-record publicly in the Munich Conference and during his visit to NATO to say unequivocally, America extends its extended deterrence capabilities to NATO and to the Indo-Pacific region.

MOULTON: Well, that's great that he said it, but the reality that's transpiring is quite different.

KADLEC: Well, sir, I think the reality is that we have aircraft, F-35s that are stationed in Europe, and we have dual capable aircraft, and we have nuclear weapons stored in Europe. And I think that's a pretty, pretty loud statement in terms of what our policy is and what our capabilities are.

MOULTON: President Macron's statement was pretty loud as well, and I think we ignore it at our peril. Dr. -- Dr. Kadlec, I was pleased to hear you talk about the challenges of dealing with two near-peer adversaries. Some might call this the three-body problem, as opposed to the two-body problem, and the mathematical challenges that that presents. I know General Cotton was pursuing this, both within the Pentagon, but also within academia. I asked -- I got the chance to talk to Admiral Correll about this.

Would either of you like to comment on how you continue -- intend to continue General Cotton's work and get us a better answer here in Congress than -- as the distinguished gentleman from Omaha said in the gentleman from Tennessee's opening statement, We don't have good numbers here. They're really outdated. And we want to be good stewards of the taxpayer dollars to get what we need for our fundamental strategic stability.

KADLEC: Sir (ph)?

CORRELL: Yes, Ranking Member Moulton, the work that General Cotton has done forms the basis of the starting point for the strategy discussion and the ongoing work in terms of force sufficiency for our nuclear forces to address that challenge.

DESJARLAIS: Gentleman yields back. Now recognize the gentleman from Omaha, General Bacon.

BACON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question. Well, I have three questions, but I just want to make a comment. Mr. Berkowitz, I appreciate what you're saying about missile defense. I couldn't imagine having this fight right now in the Middle East without it. Cities are being targeted. We see it also in Ukraine. This isn't going to go away. And leaving America undefended is not an option. So, appreciate your comments.

My first question is to Admiral Correll. We're hearing now that maybe 150 B-21 bombers is the target area. I'd like you to maybe comment on that. What is the STRATCOM numbers? Are we building the infrastructure to support that?

CORRELL: Yes, Representative Bacon, STRATCOM has -- General Cotton has gone on the record and said based on our analysis for our portfolio of capabilities and the bomber leg of the triad, that 145 is the number, you know, from a STRATCOM perspective. There's ongoing work within the Joint Force to determine what that endpoint might be. And there are, of course, investments that have been made to increase the production rate and to potentially open a second production line. That decision has yet to be made.

But clearly the B-21 represents a really significant capability, both from a conventional and a nuclear perspective for the Joint Force. It's a sixth-generation stealth capability with stand-in or stand-off precision distance strike or stand-in precision strike, and the ability to maneuver within a contested electromagnetic spectrum. So, what it enables for the Joint Force goes beyond, you know, the strike capability associated with it. It's an important capability for the Joint Force.

BACON: I sure hope we accomplish this because I know what we said about the B-2. We ended up with, if it's currently 19, I think 145 is the number we should be aiming for. Dr. Kadlec, I'd like to talk about electronic warfare. I am an electronic warfare officer by trade. The PACOM and Air Combat Command say they need 22 EA-37s. If it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at six. Coming out of this committee or the Armed Services Committee, we've been able to fund four more.

I think we have enough money for two more, but I'm not too sure if the department's going to fund 11 and (ph) 12 yet. So, I'd like to ask you, what's the plans from the department on aircraft 11 and 12, and is the target 22?

KADLEC: So, I can't talk about what's in the budget, but I would love to provide you with that briefing on where we are and where we need to be. And I do believe that in terms of what the INDOPACOM commander needs is a very important factor in what we purchase and what we supply to the warfighter.

BACON: I think all the services and the warfighters like it. The A-37 has significant capabilities way beyond the old EC-130 platform. And -- But I would tell you, if it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at 6 right now. And that concerns me. It's been Congress pushing the department to fund this platform. And so, my confidence has always been a little shaky on are we going to get to the numbers that our war fighters say they need?

My last question deals with nuclear command control, survivability. Really for Dr. Kadlec. But maybe Admiral Correll would like to comment as well. You know, we -- STRATCOM, Pentagon, White House, Peterson Air Force Base. We can all get hit in 15 minutes with hypersonic weapons. I'd like to know, what is the plan for the Looking Glass mission, one?

But two, isn't it beyond time that we have a 24-hour airborne alert again like we did for 29 years? Because I don't think we can dependably have survivable command and control without an airborne 24-hour a day alert or something comparative on the ground. And right now, I think we're leaving ourselves vulnerable and it makes me concerned. Dr. Kadlec.

KADLEC: Well, sir, I do agree with you that NC3, Nuclear Command and Control, is probably the king jewel in our crown of our nuclear deterrence and certainly the ability to ensure -- the ability to provide, you know, detection, decision space for the president and direction of our forces is critical. And whether that takes air or land or both, I do know that during my recent trip to Omaha, I saw one leg of that, and again, very impressed with the development of technologies.

And I do know that the Looking Glass next is part of the plan. So, I'll defer to Admiral Correll to offer some more specifics to timing.

BACON: I've only got a short (ph) time, but please?

CORRELL: Thanks, Dr. Kadlec, and Congressman Bacon, and I appreciate the robust discussion that we had on (inaudible) in your office and our office call. I would just reiterate what I said previously, in that we've got a -- with assured command and control, both for conventional and especially for nuclear capabilities. We've got to account for those five threat vectors.

And where we don't have the strategic warning that we feel we need, then we need to complicate the adversary's targeting problem associated with that. And so, you know, mobile distributed capability is what our trade space study associated with future command and control architecture indicates, and you know, it is likely to be a mixture of air and terrestrial mobile capability.

BACON: I yield back to the Chair -- and I'd just say to the Chair and the Ranking Member, this is something that we can really work on in this NDAA. Thank you.

DESJARLAIS: Thank you, General.

Chair now yields to the distinguished member from California, Mr. Garamendi.

GARAMENDI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. It's extremely important, unfortunately we're not going to be able to get into the depth that's necessary.

Mr. Berkowitz, you spent your entire opening in a discussion of the Golden Dome. What is the goal of the Golden Dome? And what would it cost?

BERKOWITZ: Thank you for the question, Representative. I'm going to defer any conversations about cost to the Direct Reporting Program Manager since that's outside of my purview...

GARAMENDI: Excuse me, just what are you doing if you don't know what the cost is?

BERKOWITZ: Well, I do know what the cost is, sir, but as you may be aware, there is a number from the President, I would repeat that number, but I'm not responsible for the program or its cost, I'm responsible for its (ph) -- for policy matters associated with the program.

GARAMENDI: Well, then let me go to the opening part of my question...

BERKOWITZ: Sure.

GARAMENDI: ... what is the purpose of Golden Dome? What is it to achieve?

BERKOWITZ: The purpose of Golden Dome is to provide a comprehensive next generation defense of the United States against the most consequential threats, and (ph) potentially the most catastrophic threat that we face.

Our adversaries are diversifying, expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and their long-range delivery systems. Those include ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles and other forms of advanced aerial attack.

GARAMENDI: So, the purpose for Golden Dome is to defend, to stop all of those threats, is that correct?

BERKOWITZ: The purpose of Golden Dome is to provide a defense of the homeland, and in the process to deter coercion and aggression, and in so doing, we will do so in combination, as a complement to our nuclear deterrent.

GARAMENDI: I'm going to go back to just being very simple, (inaudible) it's to stop those threats, is that correct?

BERKOWITZ: That is correct, sir. The deterrence -- but...

GARAMENDI: Good, thank you...

BERKOWITZ: ... well, if I could...

GARAMENDI: No (ph) -- General or Admiral Correll, your task is to penetrate the defensive systems of our adversaries, is that correct? Or to be able to penetrate those defensive systems?

CORRELL: That's correct.

GARAMENDI: OK -- and therefore, achieve deterrence?

CORRELL: That's correct -- the the ability to hold at risk and achieve the damage expectancy for whatever particular target we're holding at risk.

GARAMENDI: War games at the Pentagon are rather common, have you thought about how you are going to penetrate the Golden Dome defensive system? And do you a have the necessary offensive systems to do that?

CORRELL: The Golden Dome is a US capability, so we have not done analysis on our ability and that's a system that's still being developed...

GARAMENDI: OK.

CORRELL: ... in terms of adversary capabilities, we pay very close attention to those ...

GARAMENDI: I -- I'm going to go to my point here, my point is Golden Dome is to stop a whole array of nuclear threats, as just listed by Mr. Berkowitz. Your task is to provide an American system to penetrate the defensive mechanism that Russia and China might deploy. And I'm just curious how you would address the task and purpose of Golden Dome? In other words, a very interesting little war game wouldn't it be -- in other words, testing the purposes and the effectiveness of the multi-billion -- hundreds of billions of dollars that would be spent...

CORRELL: Absolutely.

GARAMENDI: ... in other words, as my Ranking Member next to me so eloquently put up in his opening statement, becomes a fool's errand here. You defend, we offence (ph), you defend, we defend, back and forth, and we're caught up in a nuclear arms race.

CORRELL: Congressman...

GARAMENDI: I'll go with that. I -- I'll yield back at this point, but it would be -- seem to me, beneficial for us to think about this in the context of the purposes of Golden Dome and how it would or would fail, would achieve or would fail its purposes.

And the kind of weapons that we presently have that might be deployed with China or Russia or even similar weapons -- much of (ph) -- many of which were already discussed here, that are now being deployed, developed by Russia and China, taking us back to Golden Dome, is it indeed, a fool's errand? I'll let that hang out there.

I yield back.

DESJARLAIS: Gentleman yields back, and just for thought purposes-- the way the pendulum swings in Washington, in 2029, this may be called Golden Dome, but would you all agree that everything that you're doing right now is something we should be doing anyway, whether it had a fancy name or not?

I see mostly nods...

(UNKNOWN): Yes (inaudible).

DESJARLAIS: Thank you all.

No disrespect to my colleagues, but I just think we get hung up on the name, more than what the purpose of what we're trying to do, because our adversaries are not slowing down.

I would (ph) now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank.

CRANK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for my voice in advance. So, I'll ask short questions and give you more time to respond.

General Guillot, is NORTHCOM prepared for the tight decision timeline needed for boost phase intercepts (ph)? And what more needs to be done in that area?

GUILLOT: Congressman, yes, we are prepared, and we train and exercise that multiple times each day.

CRANK: General Whiting, to the extent you can share in an open hearing, how do you, at Space Command view the cyber threat -- and we talked about this earlier today in my office, to our speed's capabilities? And what more can Congress be doing to ensure that we stay ahead of our adversaries in -- in this cyber domain?

WHITING: Yes Congressman, thank you for the question. We think the cyber threat is a true threat to our space capability as well. Russia and China have demonstrated they can attack us in space with weapons like direct ascent ASAT or direct energy lasers. I think they would rather attack us using cyber, because it's cheaper for them and harder for us to attribute.

So, we have to harden in the cyber domain, our space enterprise, and we've made a lot of progress in that area, but Congressman, I think -- I would ask the Congress to continue to support US Cyber Command as it grows out its forces and capabilities, and the forces of the individual services that they deliver to Cyber Command that provide defensive cyber capabilities.

We routinely have defensive cyber teams from the different services that help us harden our systems, but there's more that could be done there.

CRANK: Are the main -- are the main cyber threats, China and Russia, with regard to space, do you believe or are there other actors?

WHITING: Congressman, I agree, those are the fundamental principle threats.

CRANK: OK. And then, General Guillot, a key element of Golden Dome will be the ability to defeat missiles in the (ph) (inaudible) -- in the initial launch phase, however, the compressed timelines inherent to boost phase intercept challenge legacy command and control architectures designed around longer mid-course engagement windows? How are you thinking about your requirements for sensor integration, battle management software and operational procedures to compress the timeline, boost phase intercept?

GUILLOT: Congressman, the way we need to do this is through a layered approach that takes a variety of different types of sensors. There's not a single sensor that we can establish and put either on orbit or on the ground that will give us all of the cues that we need to go from boost phase all the way through midcourse or even into terminal phase.

So, the layered approach is essential, and perhaps the biggest challenge that General Guetlein and I discuss is how do we tie all this into a single command and control system that takes probably a dozen or more disparate command and control systems and ties it into one screen, where the operators can look from the boost, all the way through the terminal phase, and seamlessly inject all of the different sensors and effectors that it would take to defeat that.

He does think that we're on track for that, you know, within the next year too, for the demonstrated capability, and I'm confident that he'll get there.

CRANK: How about AI and how that would relate, and how do you keep a-- the reliability of a human in the loop, if we're using AI in that process?

GUILLOT: Congressman, I do think AI is necessary. What we usually face today, for example, would be a single North Korean interceptor. And if you looked (ph) -- you've been to our headquarters, you see we have six or eight different screens and hundreds of people yelling and talking about one interceptor inbound.

If we looked at a raid from a peer nation, the number that that might be, we would have to have AI, but as you mentioned, we cannot replace the human on the loop to make the decisions at the right points from detect, all the way through engagement. But it would allow us to you know, address multiple threats simultaneously, which we'd be challenged to do now.

CRANK: Thank you, General.

And I apologize to everyone in the room for my voice. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

DESJARLAIS: I thought it sounded wonderful. Mr. -- gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross for five minutes.

NORCROSS: Thank you, Chairman and for witnesses for being here today. The bulk of my questions, I'm going to hold off for the classified, but one that I think we can have the discussion here today is talking about our ability to deliver that one leg through our bomber fleets, 74 B-52s, 1920 B-2s. I'm talking for the nuclear dual-capable. And what we're looking at, the 145-ish, 21s.

Unfortunately, over the course of the last few weeks, we saw us losing six of the -- that lost or damaged six KC-135s, certainly, will make an impact, but far from the only ones that we have available. It is an aging platform. It's one that will run its time in the next part of this century.

How long it makes it, certainly up there. KC-46 is coming in quickly, and at some point, will be dual capable. But with the increased bombers, in addition to taking care of the entire flying force that we have, are the refuelers, the KC-46 being delivered, at a rate that is acceptable to keep our other platforms flying when we need it? General, or excuse me, Admiral Correll?

CORRELL: You highlight the absolute essentiality of the bomber fleet to enable air operations. Any operation the department conducts that involves the air leg is enabled by our tanker fleet -- I'm sorry. I said bomber, I meant tanker fleet.

And the [KC-135] is an aging platform, as you know, and the KC-46 is ramping up in terms of delivery and production. And the department has analyzed and indicated that we need to sustain the tanker fleet that we have and expand that tanker fleet to more platforms. The minimum number is about 502 tankers total.

NORCROSS: How many of those are dual capable? Or are you assuming they all will be?

CORRELL: Ideally, they're all dual capable. But as you know, the [KC-135] is currently nuclear certified. The KC-46 is not yet nuclear certified. But we can -- we are on a path to be able to use the new tankers to refuel nuclear-capable bombers for conventional missions. And that's where we need to get to and then fully certify for the nuclear mission.

And that's the survivability and durability piece in a trans-attack environment. But in the interim, we accept the risk and we use the capability we have to refuel all aircraft.

NORCROSS: Because as we look down the road, those numbers are increasing, those flying platforms, obviously, the nuclear capable I say would take precedent, but we don't know depending on the mission and how it's being delivered.

At the rate in Boeing has had issues, and I think we're past the back end of that. Are we getting the delivery rate? Or do we have to look at increasing that through Boeing?

CORRELL: I would advocate for continuing to look at options to accelerate delivery of the tanker fleet.

NORCROSS: I yield back.

DESJARLAIS: The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal, for five minutes.

CARBAJAL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.

General Whiting, space debris continues to be a concern in orbit. There are thousands of objects in orbit that we cannot maneuver. And at the same time, we have more satellites in orbit than ever, requiring increased maneuvers to avoid collision. This is a compounding issue and the longer we wait to address it the harder it will be to do so.

Do you view space debris as a threat to U.S. systems in orbit? And what are you doing to address this concern?

WHITING: Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Just to put a number on the scale that the debris and number of satellites has increased since U.S. Space Command was stood back up six and a half years ago. That number has gone up about 90 percent. So, we've almost doubled the number of objects on orbit in the last six and a half years.

So, we do see it as a concern, but it's something we have to work every day so that we can continue to derive the benefits of space. So, right now, the department of the -- through U.S. Space Command and our Space Force tactical squadrons provides warning to every -- we track all the objects on orbit and we provide warnings to any satellite owner or operator anywhere around the world so they can know if their satellite potentially is going to run into a piece of debris and take action.

So, it's something we are concerned about. And we applaud commercial efforts that we've seen. There's been some recent announcements in the last few months about how commercial industry is rallying to help each other understand where this debris is as well. So, we think government has a role in this but also commercial industry.

CARBAJAL: Thank you. General Whiting, let's for one second put aside the technical and fiscal concerns that have been raised with regard to the development and deployment of a space-based interceptor system.

As the combatant commander responsible for operations in and in defense of the domain, in your best military judgment, does deployment of a space-based interceptor constellation introduce risk to the domain as a new target for both Russia and the PRC?

WHITING: Congressman, I think we've already seen that Russia and China have demonstrated that they're building capabilities to hold all of our satellites at risk. So, it's hard for me to say that the introduction of another satellite or a different class of satellites is going to change the amount of capability that they're developing.

If we look at China, they have developed everything from cyber capabilities to reversible jammers, to direct-ascent ASAT weapons that can hold all orbital regimes at risk, to high-energy lasers, to co-orbital ASAT satellites. So, the breadth of threats are now there, Mr. Congressman.

CARBAJAL: Thank you. General Whiting, you recently underscored the need for space-based logistics and sustainment at the space mobility conference in January. However, investments and acquisitions that focus on space mobility and logistics beyond rapid launch don't seem to have materialized yet.

Despite increasing commercial capabilities and relevant government demonstrators going back many years, can you explain why logistical capabilities are important to sustain effective operations in space? And is the capability that SPACECOM needs in order to improve our readiness in space?

WHITING: Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I do think logistics and sustainment capabilities on orbit are critical. And not because I just want to see that result, it's because it enables maneuver warfare on orbit. And maneuver warfare has been an advantage for the United States in all domains at sea, in the air and on the ground.

And it's even a principle of warfare and it's a joint function. And we need to bring this idea that we can maneuver for advantage to space. And to do that there's several ways that are going to have to or several means that will have to be required.

But on orbit logistics, refueling and sustainment is one of those, so that we're not just sitting ducks and we can maneuver for advantage away from threats or to maneuver, you know, we're best to execute our operations from.

CARBAJAL: Thank you. Admiral Correll, we all know the issues Sentinel continues to face. This program was supposed to be fielded by the end of this decade, but we know it won't be. At the same time, Minuteman III continues to age. The test bodies are not infinite. How are you balancing the need to continue tests with the limited supply until the ground leg is modernized?

CORRELL: Thanks for the question, Congressman. I'm balancing the risk of sustainment versus bringing on the new capability and working very closely with Direct Report Portfolio Manager General White in terms of Sentinel coming online. We have a weekly conversation on where the, you know, where the opportunities are to accelerate delivery of that capability.

In those conversations, we also talk about sustainment of Minuteman III. As the combatant commander, you know, responsible for the ability to employ those capabilities, I see my job as to communicate precisely within the department where risks manifest themselves and what we're doing to mitigate those risks.

I remain confident in our ability to sustain the Minuteman III as we transition to Sentinel. And I'm encouraged by the progress that General White has made as a Direct Report Portfolio Manager with Sentinel.

CARBAJAL: Thank you. I'm out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

DESJARLAIS: The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell, for five minutes.

BELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member.

Hello to the witnesses. Thank you for being here.

Admiral Correll, the St. Louis region is home to one of the fastest growing geospatial technology ecosystems in the country, anchored with the new NGA West campus. Given how central geospatial intelligence is to nuclear command and control, targeting, and missile warning, how is STRATCOM integrating next-generation geospatial analytics and AI-enabled data from places like NGA West into strategic deterrence operations?

CORRELL: Congressman, we have a phased approach. And we've built an analytic engine to account for the threat environment for those five threat vectors that I talked about before, accurately representing those threat vectors and testing the new capabilities to come online.

The capabilities you're referring to are part of the universe of capabilities that we're considering for next-generation nuclear command and control, and I acknowledge the importance of those capabilities.

BELL: And workforce development is something I've prioritized during my time in Congress. From STRATCOM's perspective, how important is a skilled workforce and resilient industrial base to sustaining long-term strategic deterrence?

CORRELL: Congressman, it is exceptionally important. It's essential.

BELL: Thank you. General Guillot, you've been busy today. Our missile and homeland defenses ultimately depend on a resilient defense industrial base. Whether it is interceptors, sensors, or aircraft, we cannot afford gaps in production or capability -- or capacity, excuse me, when we have numerous adversaries watching our every move.

Communities like mine in St. Louis play a critical role in that ecosystem through advanced aerospace manufacturing and a strong supplier base. From your perspective, how important is maintaining a strong domestic aerospace industrial base to sustaining our strategic deterrence and homeland defense posture?

GUILLOT: Congressman, it's extremely important. And we also benefit from many of the NGA capabilities that Admiral Correll spoke about, and then into the aircraft manufacture and development, keeping a fleet of aircraft that can operate in the high Arctic all the way down to the southeast part of the United States, is imperative. We have some old but very capable aircraft, but they're going through the process with the Air Force of being replaced.

And I know that some of the manufacturers that you're talking about are critical to that, giving us longer range, more ability to carry -- ability to carry more weapons at the same time, and having fused avionics that bring in inputs from all different types of sensors into the cockpit, all which benefit NORAD and NORTHCOM.

BELL: Thank you.

General Whiting, China is reportedly developing satellites capable of inspecting, moving, or, potentially, disabling other spacecraft, potentially ours. How concerned is Space Command about these capabilities being used to physically interfere with U.S. military satellites during a crisis?

WHITING: Thank you, Congressman, for the question.

It's a capability we have to pay great attention to, because we've seen China demonstrate that capability on orbit by maneuvering a satellite to one of their defunct satellites, moving that satellite up to a higher orbit, and then first satellite returning.

And while that might have a commercial or a civil use, it also demonstrates a military capability. So, we have to consider all of those from a dual-use perspective as potential threats and make sure that we have mitigation strategies appropriately.

BELL: And then, quickly, do we have the ability to detect and attribute these types of operations in real-time?

WHITING: Congressman, we have the -- an outstanding -- or, let me say this. So, we have the world's best space domain awareness capability, but I would like it to be even better, so that I can (inaudible) constant -- maintain constant custody of these kind of potential threats.

So, you asked if we can do that in near real-time. We work every day to try to mitigate the amount of time it would take us to detect that, but I cannot say today we can do that in real time.

BELL: Thank you, and I yield back.

DESJARLAIS: Gentleman yields back. And last but not least, my Democratic colleagues have a very deep bench today, and I appreciate your interest in this very important hearing, I recognize a gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides, for five minutes.

WHITESIDES: Today and every day, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Good to see you all.

I tell my kids that this is the subcommittee where we have the adults in the room, and I think that that's very important when we're dealing with a subject that has the capacity to cause extreme damage to human civilization.

It's very important to know that we have serious people in charge of the relevant organizations, and I know that you are serious people.

I have one comment and three questions.

My comment is directed primarily at General Whiting, which is simply that I believe that the United States is acting as the most responsible actor in space, and I think it's crucial that we continue to be so.

I know that you share that commitment. That extends from public to classified worlds.

As we head into, frankly, a singularity moment in space activity, it is crucial, I think, that we continue to set a good example for the rest of the world on how space can be maintained sustainably, whether militarily or in commercial areas.

And so, I would just urge you to carry on that ethos that is, I think, embodied in the new and young organizations that you lead.

B-21, Admiral Correll, it was great to meet with you and discuss your approach and priorities, including the importance of the air-based leg of deterrence. As you know, I'm extremely proud to represent the folks at Palmdale and the people who build the B-21.

Can you briefly describe the ways in which the ability to more quickly produce the necessary aircraft in the fleet could act as an effective deterrent to our adversaries?

CORRELL: Congressman, because the B-21 represents that 6th generation stealth capability and what I talked about earlier, it's enabling function for the joint force. The sooner we feel that capability and the sooner we ramp up in delivery of that capability, the stronger position that puts the joint force in to address the strategic environment from deterrence to any spectrum of conflict that we would contemplate.

WHITESIDES: Thank you. And I support Congressman Bacon's support of the 145 number.

Mr. Berkowitz, you've written extensively on our asymmetric vulnerability regarding GPS and PNT. China and Russia have developed robust terrestrial backups for their satellite navigation.

Does our current policy prioritize a domestic terrestrial backup, and how are we incentivizing the commercial sector to harden their PNT-dependent infrastructure against the navigational warfare you've warned about?

BERKOWITZ: Thank you very much for that question.

I absolutely share your concern about the need to make sure that we have a very robust set of capabilities to provide both space-based and terrestrial PNT services to all of our critical infrastructures and especially for national defense.

As I mentioned previously, the -- we're in the process of implementing the President's executive order on ensuring U.S. space superiority.

One of the issues we're going to be taking up is looking at our PNT policy. As part of the overall process of reviewing -- as a new administration, reviewing all of our policies, we're going to be focusing in particular on the question of the future of our space-based PNT capability and assuring that that is, not only robust, but resilient, sir.

WHITESIDES: Thank you. And I -- absolutely, I should have mentioned space-based backup capabilities as well.

Dr. Kadlec, briefly, you've identified deterring adversary biological weapons use as a top-tier priority alongside nuclear deterrence. In the context of this hearing, are we properly integrating bioresilience into our integrated deterrence framework, or is this still being treated as a separate health crisis issue?

How does our budget and our policies reflect the reality that a biological strike could be a strategic prelude to a kinetic or nuclear conflict?

KADLEC: Sir, thank you for the question.

I think the key thing here is that we're in the process here right now in response to a joint urgent operational need by INDOPACOM commander to actually deploy a biodeterrence approach into the INDOPACOM theater.

And it's not focused on public health as it is an indication's early warning characterization and attribution. And this is really the link of integrating biodeterrence with our nuclear capabilities or capabilities to respond in a way that would be decisive in response to some use of this in that theater, and then, again, propagated globally around the world, as well as, domestically.

So, we're in the midst of that. I would be welcome to come and brief your staff and yourself on that, because it's -- it gets a little geeky. But I think the point here is the intent is we're trying to operationalize this in real-time to meet a commander's need.

WHITESIDES: Thank you. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS: And I'd like to thank all our witnesses today for their testimony, very insightful, and I'll look forward to continuing our discussion in the closed setting. We'll meet upstairs in approximately five minutes after a short comfort break, if needed. The open portion of the hearing is now adjourned.

END