03/19/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 03/19/2026 10:42
The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on the ongoing escalation between Israel and Hezbollah and its consequences on Lebanon.
Three weeks into the war in Iran, Israel's military campaign in Lebanon rages on. Although the 2024 ceasefire had already proved ineffective, Hezbollah's air attack on northern Israel on 2 March contributed to further escalating the conflict. Although Hezbollah seemed severely weakened since the prolonged war that has followed the October 7 attacks and Israel's war on the Gaza strip, the group has been reorganising and is now showcasing notable military capabilities. This time, however, the impact on Lebanon has been markedly different, with the Shia-majority region south of the Litani river and Beirut's southern districts being depopulated by the Israeli Defence Forces' (IDF) evacuation orders, leaving more than one million people displaced - including 367,000 children. As a result, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased from the already staggering pre-war figure of 4.1 million. The IDF's strikes have already left 968 people killed and 2,432 injured, also hitting areas otherwise deemed secure - including downtown Beirut - as well as civilian infrastructure such as residential buildings and, most recently, two bridges over the Litani river. As Israeli ground operations in Lebanese territory expanded on 16 March - with no detailed strategic goals attached - concern over a full-scale invasion has become widespread. Tellingly, UNIFIL troops have been reportedly hit in the past few days, with Israel admitting to have mistakenly opened fire on one of their positions. The war has had inevitable repercussions on Lebanon's internal political balance. Faced with the dilemma of whether to act against or side with Hezbollah, the approach of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAM) has remained non-confrontational, while the allegedly deliberate killing of three Lebanese soldiers by the IDF signals a further escalation of the conflict. As the risks of further destabilisation increase - both on a domestic and on a regional level -, reaching a ceasefire is critical. In this sense, France has stepped in to advance its proposal - which would entail for the first time a normalisation between Lebanon and Israel. However, as Israel remains reluctant to commit, the key to de-escalation seems out of reach. As the picture keeps unfolding, how is the war reshaping Lebanon's society, political system and institutional capacity? What are Israel's goals in this war and how far is its leadership willing to go to achieve them? And what are the risks for Lebanon and the region as the escalation continues?
Experts from the ISPI network discuss the ongoing escalation between Israel and Hezbollah and its consequences on Lebanon.
"Fifteen months since the last war, Lebanon is once again a battlefield. For fifteen months, Lebanese and international observers alike have indulged in imagining a different Lebanon. Albeit slowly, a new president and a new government were finally acting on promises of reforms and institutional renewal. Yet, these were also fifteen months of ultimata, never-ending strikes and half-baked debates on disarmament. Was little more than one year sufficient to secure Lebanon and reform its institutions? Surely not. But that window was meant to avoid precisely what we are seeing today: a new round of destruction and the prospects of another Israeli invasion. The latest victim of this new round of war might be the dream of a secure and reformed Lebanon."
Mattia Serra, Associate Research Fellow, ISPI
"The Lebanese Army will not move against Hezbollah while Israel is bombing Lebanon and conducting ground operations in the south. Politically, it cannot be seen disarming a domestic actor while the country is under external attack. Operationally, it is unrealistic to expect an underfunded, under-equipped army to achieve in weeks what Israel, despite overwhelming military superiority, has failed to do for years - especially while the army itself is coming under Israeli fire. This does not mean the army has no role. Even during the ongoing fighting, it can do more to deploy more visibly across the country, including in areas like Dahiyeh, to signal the reassertion of state sovereignty. But actual disarmament will have to come through a negotiated political process after this round of fighting, with the army as the central implementing institution."
Nadim Houry, Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative
"The displacement of over one million people from southern Lebanon is placing acute pressure on already fragile host regions. In the short term, overstretched infrastructure and limited shelter capacity are serious issues. Lebanon's deep economic crisis, made worse by energy shocks and a highly fragile electricity sector, adds to these challenges. Displaced communities will likely suffer the most, while hosts also face increased burdens. Israeli targeting patterns are purposefully intensifying these pressures. Due to difficulties in identifying Hezbollah strongholds and core members, Israel has expanded the location and scope of its strikes, now affecting displaced populations and lower-tier affiliates alongside Hezbollah members. This approach has effectively broadened the impact on the wider Shi'ite community and increased the risks associated with hosting displaced persons. Recent strikes have impacted civilians, including displaced families, journalists, academics, and first responders. This pattern is likely to deepen the isolation of Shi'i communities, heighten inter-communal tensions, and further reinforce Lebanon's structural fragmentation."
Nancy Ezzeddine, Research Associate, Clingendael
"Israel's seventh incursion into southern Lebanon underscores the enduring paradox of UNIFIL: a mission routinely caught in the crossfire and at times deliberately targeted. In the absence of political settlement, UNIFIL remains a central platform for international coordination and oversight of the Lebanon-Israel conflict. Despite constraints, UNIFIL continues to perform critical functions: shining an international spotlight on violations of Resolution 1701, documenting potential war crimes, and facilitating humanitarian aid and access. Although the mission is scheduled to conclude at the end of the year, deteriorating conditions on the ground - echoing previous cycles of violence - are likely to strengthen the case for renewal in the Security Council. UNIFIL's persistence therefore reflects its continued relevance in managing rather than resolving the conflict."
Vanessa Newby, Senior Lecturer, Monash University, and Chiara Ruffa, Professor, Sciences Po
"From Israel's perspective, the priority was to avoid opening a Lebanese front in its conflict with Iran. However, after sixteen months, it became clear that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were insufficient in dismantling Hezbollah's capabilities, prompting Israel to take action. When Hezbollah initiated hostilities, Israel recognised the need to create a secure zone between its northern border and Hezbollah, while dismantling the terror group's infrastructure. Regarding the military operation in Lebanon, it should be clear Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. Any territory Israel controls is solely for the security of its northern communities. Israel's primary goal is to establish a security zone of 8-10 kilometres from its border, corresponding to the range of Hezbollah's anti-tank missiles, as its defence systems have proven effective against rockets / UAVs. Every military operation serves a broader political purpose. For Israel, this means ensuring security and advancing toward an agreement with Lebanon. Therefore, Israel will not commit to a fixed timetable, as the duration depends on achieving security. However, once its goals are achieved - including Hezbollah's demobilisation and security agreements - Israel will be more than willing to return to internationally recognised borders. The initiative aims to reduce the threat from Hezbollah while emphasising the need for a joint plan to weaken Hezbollah and strengthen the Lebanese state."
Oded Gertman, Programme Director, MIND
"Despite a great deal of media noise suggesting otherwise, bilateral relations between Syria and Lebanon have advanced amid this latest wider regional conflict. As hostilities erupted, Syrian officials intensified diplomatic contact with Lebanese counterparts, at the President, Foreign Minister and Ambassador levels. Calls were also made to Lebanese Christian and Druze political leaders, while cross-border military and security coordination has been sustained daily for weeks. These contacts ensured that when Hezbollah militants fired several artillery shells into western Syria late on March 9, the Iranian proxy did not get the military counter response that it wanted. Meanwhile, the step-by-step process of building bilateral relations has continued unabated, with more than 130 Syrian detainees transferred from Roumieh Prison to Syrian custody on March 17, for example."
Charles Lister, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute
"With the large-scale resumption of Israeli violence against Lebanon, the special, centuries-old relationship between Paris and Beirut could not allow the former to avoid taking a stance of solidarity with the latter. But more importantly, through its proposal to mediate between Lebanon and Israel, France hopes to regain, even partially, its traditionally significant role in Lebanon. Following the November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, resident Joseph Aoun was elected, and Prime minister Nawaf Salam was appointed, both in early 2025, and both under US-Saudi sponsorship. This de facto tutelage came at the expense of France's traditional influence and detailed recommendations. The Israeli-Lebanese impasse is therefore seen in Paris as an opportunity to reaffirm the French legitimacy in Lebanon."
Aurélie Daher, Assistant Professor, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL